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Abstract
In clinical neurology, a comprehensive understanding of consciousness has been regarded as an abstract concept -
best left to philosophers. However, times are changing and the need to clinically assess consciousness is increas-
ingly becoming a real-world, practical challenge. Current methods for evaluating altered levels of consciousness are
highly reliant on either behavioural measures or anatomical imaging. While these methods have some utility, esti-
mates of misdiagnosis are worrisome (as high as 43%) - clearly this is a major clinical problem. The solution must
involve objective, physiologically based measures that do not rely on behaviour. This paper reviews recent
advances in physiologically based measures that enable better evaluation of consciousness states (coma, vegetative
state, minimally conscious state, and locked in syndrome). Based on the evidence to-date, electroencephalographic
and neuroimaging based assessments of consciousness provide valuable information for evaluation of residual
function, formation of differential diagnoses, and estimation of prognosis.
Review
Introduction
Consciousness is a poorly-defined concept, the meaning
of which is more a matter of debate than an issue of
certainty [1-4]. While philosophy has focused on the
mind-body problem, and psychology has focused on
knowledge of experience [1], remarkably little attention
has been paid to the practical problems that arise from
our inability to rigorously evaluate consciousness in the
clinical setting. Given the myriad of common disorders
that alter consciousness, the need for more sophisticated
clinical assessment methods is an important and prag-
matic issue.
The dilemma of assessing consciousness is also of
public interest - and the public is looking towards medi-
cal science for insights. This public fascination with con-
sciousness was well exemplified by the media attention
focused upon the medical/legal/ethical problems of the
Terri Schiavo and Terry Wallis cases [5]. These cases
highlighted the need to assess an individual’sl e v e lo f
consciousness beyond simply observing their beha-
vioural status. More recently, the dramatic increase in
survivable brain injuries occurring during military con-
flicts is also emphasizing the need for improved tools
with which to assess consciousness [6,7].
Regrettably, the time-honored structural imaging tech-
niques (computed tomography, magnetic resonance ima-
ging) and crude behavioural assessments (Glasgow
Coma Scale) that are routinely used to assess altered
consciousness are inadequate. While other more sophis-
ticated measures exist (e.g., JFK Coma Recovery Scale -
Revised), many of these tests rely on the observation of
behaviours (e.g., motor and/or communicative
responses) that may be impaired in brain injured people.
Indeed, such behaviours are often decoupled from con-
sciousness as a direct result of the brain injury. Accord-
ingly, there is a critical need to improve the clinical
evaluation of consciousness using non behavioral based,
physiologically based measures. Although ignored for
routine clinical application, electrophysiological mea-
sures such as evoked potentials and event-related poten-
tials or ERPs (derived from electroencephalography, * Correspondence: Donald.Weaver@dal.ca
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respect, electroencephalography and related methods
represent an option that provides valuable clinical
insight while being more accessible than other func-
tional imaging modalities (e.g. functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging). This report examines the potential
clinical utility of an electrophysiological approach to the
assessment of consciousness. Such electrophysiological
indicators of consciousness have emerged from both
diagnostic and prognostic studies, which support the
interplay of these two key clinical questions. Please note
that this report is not intended to be an exhaustive
review of the literature. Rather, we describe representa-
tive examples illustrating how the assessment of con-
sciousness may be improved with electrophysiological as
well as neuroimaging techniques.
States of Consciousness
Consciousness is a complex brain centered state of sub-
jective experience. Although various models exist, con-
sciousness is commonly defined by the dual aspects of
wakefulness and awareness (of both the external envir-
onment and the inner self): wakefulness refers to the
sub-state that permits open eyes and a degree of motor
arousal (i.e. wakefulness defines the level of conscious-
ness); awareness refers to the sub-state that enables
experience of thoughts, memories, and emotions (i.e.
awareness defines the content of consciousness) [8].
Although wakefulness and awareness are intimately con-
nected - in general, one has to be awake to be aware - it
is possible to identify circumstances under which they
are dissociated: in complex partial seizures wakefulness
can occur without awareness; in rapid eye movement
sleep it is possible to be aware but not awake.
Currently, four diagnostic levels are used to describe
the spectrum of disordered consciousness: coma, vegeta-
tive state, minimally conscious state, and locked-in syn-
drome (it should be noted that although these terms are
among the most discussed and familiar, a wide range of
terms exist to describe patients across the spectra used
to describe consciousness - e.g., acute confusional state,
amnestic state, and obtunded). While these four terms
do not completely describe all patients, they provide a
useful classification starting point that is widely used in
the literature.
Coma (a state of deep, unarousable unconsciousness)
typically follows either brainstem injury or bilateral
hemispheric damage [9]. Individuals in coma have an
absence of both wakefulness and awareness.
From coma, a person may transition into a vegetative
state (See Figure 1) [10,11]. This condition is character-
ized by wakefulness without awareness. Vegetative peo-
ple have their eyes open and retain sleep and wake
cycles, yet are unaware of themselves or their surround-
ings; they may even spontaneously grimace, cry or smile
[8]. A vegetative state typically occurs when the brain-
stem is intact, but the cortexi se x t e n s i v e l yd a m a g e d
[10,12], although thalamic lesions are commonly
reported in this condition as well [13,14]. Not surpris-
ingly, the vegetative state is difficult to evaluate as an
altered level of consciousness.
The concept of a minimally conscious state is a rela-
tively new diagnostic entity. Minimally conscious state is
a condition in which consciousness is severely altered
but some behavioural evidence of awareness remains; i.
e., wakefulness with significantly diminished awareness
[15]. Evidence of awareness may be demonstrated
through proper use of common objects (e.g. a comb) or
through non-verbal communication. The minimally con-
scious state can persist indefinitely or progress to full
consciousness [15,16].
Another level of conscious n e s si sl o c k e d - i ns y n -
drome, a condition associated with injury to the ven-
tral pons [17,18]. Locked-in syndrome is characterized
by intact wakefulness and awareness, but with quadri-
plegia and expressive anarthria; thus the afflicted indi-
vidual has preserved consciousness, but, because of an
inability to produce behavioural responses, appears to
be unconscious [17]. This state typically follows an
acute stage of impaired consciousness. Locked-in syn-
d r o m ei su n i q u ei nt h a tp a t i e n t si nt h i sd i s o r d e r e d
consciousness state have been able to relay their
experiences. One prominent case of locked-in syn-
drome is that of Bauby, who provided a personal
account of his experiences; Bauby describes witnessing
discussions about his condition, while being helplessly
unable to tell anyone that he was awake, aware and
“really in there” [19]. His writings eloquently highlight
a critical problem - the lack of effective clinical assess-
ments for awareness/consciousness.
The seriousness of the consciousness assessment pro-
blem is demonstrated by the situation in which almost
half of cases are misdiagnosed. Specifically, examination
of the failings of conventional diagnostic approaches has
yielded a misdiagnosis rate as high as 43% [20-22]. The
Glasgow Coma Scale remains the “gold standard” for
routine assessment of consciousness, but relies exclu-
sively on behavioural responses [23,24]. Likewise the
Disability Rating Scale also involves basic behavioural
functions like eye opening, communication and motor
response [25]. Although other measures of conscious-
ness exist, all are based on behavioural signs of con-
sciousness that are subjectively observed. The search for
objective physiological measures of consciousness
yielded electrophysiological approaches, which were
soon followed by functional imaging approaches [26].
While both approaches can provide valuable informa-
tion, the current paper focuses on electrophysiology as
this technology is readily available across a range of
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consciousness assessment problem [27].
Advances in Functional Neuroimaging
Functional imaging (as opposed to structural imaging,
which produces “brain pictures”) describes the broad
array of techniques used to assess brain function from
a physiological perspective (as opposed to anatomical)
[28]. One of the most well known approaches is func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging [29,30]. Using func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging, it is possible to
track fluctuations in blood oxygenation in order to
localize functionally active regions in the brain. When
assessing consciousness, for example, functional mag-
netic resonance imaging has been used to examine
activation differences between blocks of normal speech
and reversed speech, making it possible to isolate
regions involved in higher-level auditory processing
[31,32].
Though less well known, electrophysiology represents
a more established clinical option, in which evoked
potentials and event-related potentials are derived from
scalp-recorded electroencephalography. Evoked poten-
tials and event-related potentials are responses that
occur during the presentation of or in response to
stimuli and provide an on-line record of information
processing in the brain [33]. The term evoked potentials
(EPs) generally refers to sensory processing responses,
whereas, event-related potentials (ERPs) refers to per-
ceptual and cognitive processing responses. In terms of
nomenclature, both tend to be named according to their
polarity and latency; thus, an N100 component is a
negative-going waveform that peaks around 100 ms
after the stimulus.
Sensory EPs are most commonly used for clinical
assessment of basic sensory functions. Brainstem audi-
tory evoked potentials (BAEPs) occur in the 10 ms
range and are often employed in the assessment of
coma. The absence of an intact brain stem response is
indicative of a poor prognosis for recovery [34]. Sensory
EPs also include somatosensory evoked potentials
(SEPS), middle-latency auditory evoked potentials
(MLAEPs), and visual EPs (VEPs) that occur in the 30
ms range and are used to evaluate primary sensory cor-
tices. Cognitive ERPs are used to evaluate higher level
functions like attention, memory, and language, which
make them well-suited to assessing aspects of conscious-
ness [35]. One of the most well known ERPs is the
P300, which is elicited to an improbable or “oddball”
Figure 1 States of Consciousness by level of wakefulness/awareness.
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muli. (eg, auditory tones) [36-38].
ERP studies focusing on the assessment of conscious
awareness have frequently examined four specific com-
ponents - the N100, the mismatch negativity (MMN),
the P300, and the N400 [35-39]. The N100 indexes sen-
sory/perceptual functions during visual, auditory and
somatosensory processing [40,41]. The MMN, a nega-
tive-going waveform occurring around 150-250 ms, has
been linked to perceptual processing of deviant auditory
stimuli that occurs below the level of conscious aware-
ness [42]. The P300, which also occurs to deviant or
odball stimuli, is thought to reflect higher level proces-
sing, such as immediate memory [37]. It is often known
as the “Ah Hah!” response. Another important cognitive
ERP component is the N400 [43,44]. The N400 is com-
monly observed following sentences that end with
semantically inappropriate words ("He takes coffee with
cream and socks”). The semantic violations can be used
to assess language comprehension, by examining
whether an N400 is present when comparing sentences
with and without appropriate endings [45-49].
Physiologically Based Evaluations of Consciousness
Electrophysiological approaches can be used to assess
consciousness (i.e. awareness) across the spectrum of
pathologies associated with disordered consciousness.
Coma
BAEPs are often employed in the assessment of coma,
with the absence of response being indicative of a poor
prognosis [50]. Additionally, the absence of cortical
components of SEPs and of MLAEPs can also be strong
indicators of a poor prognosis [51,52]. Although not
currently implemented for routine use, cognitive ERPs
have shown promise in determining prognosis. Fischer
et al. evaluated 350 comatose patients with auditory EPs
and ERPs (N100 and MMN components). They found
that the MMN response was the strongest predictor of
functional recovery [50]. Strikingly, 88.6% of individuals
with the MMN response progressed towards awakening,
corresponding with other studies, which show that the
MMN can predict progression towards improved levels
of consciousness [34,53,54]. Furthermore, recent meta-
analysis indicated that the MMN and P300 are signifi-
cantly more accurate than the N100 at predicting awa-
kening [55]. In accordance with this, another study by
Fischer et al., demonstrated that a novelty P300 elicited
by the subjects own name can be used to enhance the
sensitivity of assessment with the MMN and thereby
increase prognostic utility in comatose patients [56].
Vegetative State
Because vegetative state precludes verbal and motor
responses, patients must be evaluated with alternative
means, such as ERPs. Connolly et al.u s e dc o g n i t i v e
ERPs in the case of man with a left temporal lobe knife
wound whose ability to comprehend language was
unknown (Figure 2) [47]. The task involved visual and
auditory presentation of semantically appropriate and
inappropriate sentences. The data from the auditory
task showed a clear N400 response, indicating that
awareness was intact and illustrating that cognitive ERPs
can be used to assess awareness in individuals unable to
communicate (Figure 3) [47].
Wijnen et al. used the MMN response to predict func-
tional recovery in vegetative state. Ten patients were
assessed with the MMN and the P300 [57]. The results
indicated that larger MMN components were associated
with improved signs of consciousness. Importantly, Wij-
nen et al. found that individuals with higher amplitudes
and shorter latencies in their MMN measurement were
more likely to have a higher level of consciousness two
years later. Electrophysiological evaluations can be aug-
mented by functional imaging techniques to further
enhance the assessment of consciousness. For instance,
functional magnetic resonance imaging and positron
emission tomography studies of patients in altered levels
of consciousness typically assess passive activation pat-
terns, such as patient responses to their own name [32].
Recently, Owen et al. pursued a unique approach when
evaluating a 23 year old female in a vegetative state [58].
After confirming that the patient was able to hear audi-
tory stimuli, she was given two mental imagery tasks to
assess level of awareness. She was asked to imagine
playing a game of tennis and to imagine visiting all of
the rooms in her home (spatial navigation imagery).
Both tasks elicited activation patterns that were indistin-
guishable from those produced by controls (supplemen-
tary motor areas during tennis task and
parahippocampal gyrus, posterior parietal cortex and lat-
eral premotor cortex during home task). Therefore, the
authors concluded that the patient retained the ability
to respond to language despite being diagnosed with
vegetative state (although the possibility remains that
this patient may have been minimally conscious and
misdiagnosed as vegetative, especially given the high
misdiagnosis rate) [58]. Studies like this highlight the
ability to evaluate intent, which is a critical component
of awareness and represents a different approach than
measures that evaluate indicators for information pro-
cessing (e.g., ERPs) [12].
Minimally Conscious State
Most of the work on the minimally conscious state has
used functional imaging to differentiate it from vegeta-
tive state. Boly et al. utilized
15O-radiolabeled water
positron emission tomography to examine differences
between minimally conscious state (N = 5) and vegeta-
t i v es t a t e( N=1 5 ) .T h ep a t i e n t sw e r et e s t e dw i t has e r -
ies of auditory ‘clicks’ approximately one month after
being admitted to hospital [59]. The authors found
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minimally conscious state patients compared to vegeta-
tive state patients. In addition, minimally conscious state
patients demonstrated stronger functional connectivity
between secondary auditory cortex and posterior tem-
poral and prefrontal association areas [59]. Di et al. used
functional magnetic resonance imaging to study the dif-
ferential diagnosis between vegetative state (N = 7) and
minimally conscious state (N = 4) by presenting the
patients own name (spoken by a family member). All of
the minimally conscious state patients showed activation
in primary and higher order auditory cortex. Interest-
ingly, all but two vegetative state patients showed less
activation than minimally conscious state patients, with
these two patients subsequently progressing to mini-
mally conscious state within three months. These results
provide further support that functional neuroimaging of
auditory processing may be used to distinguish different
levels of consciousness [60].
Figure 2 Axial CT scan of a 21 year old male who was stabbed in the left temporal lobe. Scan was taken 4 weeks post-injury and
showed no difference from original scans (adapted from Connolly et al., 1999).
Figure 3 ERP recordings from a 21 year old patient diagnosed with vegetative state and a matched healthy control. Both the patient
and control show an N400 response to semantically inappropriate sentences that were spoken (adapted from Connolly et al., 1999).
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Family members, nurses and therapists are often more
likely than physicians to realize that people with locked-in
syndrome are conscious [61]. Electrophysiological
approaches, such as cognitive ERPs, can diagnose this
state at an early time point. Onofrj et al. studied four indi-
viduals suspected of having locked-in syndrome using the
P300 [62]. The results indicated that a prototypical P300
waveform could be reliably detected in each of these peo-
ple. The finding of residual cognitive function supported
the diagnosis of locked-in syndrome as opposed to vegeta-
tive state [62]. The Onofrj et al. study is consistent with
the results of other work using cognitive ERPs to evaluate
awareness in locked-in syndrome [63].
Limitations
Electrophysiological assessments of consciousness are
quite promising, yet a number of limitations to clinical
implementation have been identified. Given that these
tools still reside within the research realm, there is lim-
ited normative data. In particular, more research needs
to be done on the diagnostic/prognostic accuracy of spe-
cific components within a test battery [63,64]. In gen-
eral, electrophysiological and neuroimaging techniques
are prone to type II errors rather than type I errors,
meaning that such assessments may underestimate cog-
nitive functioning. A potential explanation put forth by
Neumann and Kotchoubey is fluctuations in arousal/
alertness [65]; given this, a practical solution may be to
assess patients on more than one occasion. There are
also technical challenges related to recording reliable,
artifact free EEG/ERPs in clinical settings (e.g., noisy
environments and ease of implementation). However,
advances in both hardware and software are actively
being designed and implemented to address these issues.
New amplifiers for portable applications exist and meth-
ods have been developed for the quantification of wave-
form data for user-independent clinical use. With the
coming advances on all of these fronts, it will be possi-
ble to begin assessing the reliability and validity of elec-
trophysiological measures directly within the clinical
environment. This represents the critical next step to
improving the practical assessment of consciousness.
Conclusions
Electrophysiological approaches, particularly when com-
bined with functional imaging, can provide objective,
clinically relevant assessments of consciousness - even
in the presence of concomitant motor and communica-
tion problems. The MMN response shows promise in
determining prognosis in coma and vegetative state; the
MMN and the P300 have diagnostic utility across a
range of different levels of awareness. The N400 is parti-
cularly useful for indexing high level awareness, such as
intact comprehension. When used comprehensively in
conjunction with other functional imaging modalities
(functional magnetic resonance imaging, positron emis-
sion tomography), electrophysiological evaluations have
demonstrated value in ascertaining differential diagnosis,
residual function, and prognosis. Moreover, cognitive
ERPs can be used to evaluate information processing
which, in turn, can be used as an indicator of preserved
function in brain-injured individuals.
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